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The Maquiladora Problem in the Age of NAFrA: Where
Will We Find Solutions?
David Voigt
Mexico's maquiladora industry' has led to a tremendous
amount of industrial development along the Mexican border
with the United States in the last 25 years. 2 This manufacturing
corridor has provided a much needed boost to the Mexican economy, and has created hundreds of thousands of jobs. 3 The development of the maquiladora industry, however, has not come
without costs. When the industry began, Mexico had little environmental regulation. As the industry grew, the improper disposal of hazardous waste by maquiladoras turned much of the
border between Mexico and the United States into an environmental disaster zone. 4 This phenomenon of environmental degradation will be referred to as the "maquiladora problem."
The recent signing of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) 5 and the increase in economic interaction
1. A maquiladora is a foreign owned production plant in Mexico in which
raw materials and component parts are imported duty-free, and finished products are exported back to the country from which the raw materials originated,
with duties charged only on the value added in Mexico. See infra part I.A. The
"maquiladora industry" refers to Mexico's in-bond industry. See infra note 14
and accompanying text.
2. Since 1983, the maquiladora industry has grown at a phenomenal rate.
Abelardo L. Valdez, Expanding the Concept of CoproductionBeyond the Maquiladora: Toward a More Effective PartnershipBetween the United States and
Mexico, and the CaribbeanBased Countries, 22 INT'L LAw. 393, 394 (1988). For
several years now, the maquiladora industry has been Mexico's second largest
source of foreign exchange, following only the petroleum/hydrocarbons industry. Id. at 397 n.18.
3. As of November 1991, 379,772 people were employed at 1,739 maquiladoras along the U.S.-Mexico border. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
SUMMARY - ENVIRONMENTAL PLAN FOR THE MEXICAN-U.S. BORDER AREA 9
(1992) [hereinafter EPA BORDER PLAN SuMMARY]. This is an increase of 52%

and 117% respectively over the figures from just 5 years earlier. As of 1986, the
maquiladora industry employed almost 250,000 workers in 800 maquiladoras.
Valdez, supra note 2, at 398.
4. See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
5. The North American Free Trade Agreement, the parties to which are
the United States, Mexico, and Canada, was completed on September 6, 1992
and was signed on December 17, 1992 by U.S. President Bush, Canadian Prime
Minister Mulroney, and Mexican President Salinas. The Agreement has not
yet been approved by the U.S. Congress. North American Free Trade Agree-
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between the United States and Mexico have drawn a great deal
of attention to the maquiladora problem. Environmentalists
fear that the problem will worsen if immediate remedial action
is not taken.6 Many had hoped that NAFTA would specifically
address the problem and offer tangible solutions. Others argue
enthat the economic benefits NAFTA generates will facilitate
7
vironmental clean-up and protection along the border.
This Note explores the degree to which NAFTA offers solutions to the maquiladora problem, and assesses the feasibility of
alternative solutions. Part I examines the history and future of
the maquiladora program, and the significance of the pollution
problem. Part II provides a background of the legal and regulatory structure governing the maquiladora industry. Part III provides an analysis of NAFTA's environmental provisions and how
they may affect the maquiladora problem. Finally, Part IV explores non-NAFTA solutions to the problem. This Note concludes that, although NAFTA does not offer adequate solutions
to the maquiladora problem, it may help facilitate the successful
implementation of other solutions.
I. THE MAQUILADORA PROGRAM
A.

HISTORY

Maquiladoras are manufacturing plants in Mexico that import raw materials or component parts duty free, process or assemble them, export the finished products back to the country
of origin, and pay tariffs only on the value added in Mexico.8
Maquiladoras are foreign owned and managed, 9 allowing the
ment, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Mexico-Canada, (Draft of Sept. 6, 1992) [hereinafter

NAFTA].
6. Critics of NAFTA fear that the treaty will turn Mexico into a "pollution haven" as Mexico attempts to attract foreign investment. Malissa H. McKeith & Mary Hall, Environmental Compromise: Striking the Balance
Between Trade and Ecology, 15 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 724 (Nov. 4, 1992).
7. This proposition has divided environmentalists. Some believe that to
get rich first, and then clean up later, is a fundamentally flawed concept, see
infra text accompanying note 198; while others believe the economic benefits
NAFTA will generate are the only hope for environmental improvement, see
infra note 200.
8. These reduced tariffs are defined in Tariff Schedules of the United
States, 19 U.S.C. § 1202. Their purpose is to facilitate and encourage the participation of U.S. companies in this type of foreign manufacturing program. These
incentives make manufacturing programs such as that offered by the maquiladora industry especially attractive to U.S. corporations. Valdez, supra note 2,
at 396.
9. Foreign ownership under the maquiladora program is permitted as an
exception to Mexican law. Under Mexico's Foreign Investment Law, majority
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owners to take advantage of Mexico's relatively inexpensive labor costs. 10 This type of operation can be described as a system
of coproduction, whereby two or more countries combine the
human resources of one country with the natural resources or
raw materials of another to develop a single product. 1 Most ma-

quiladoras are American owned, and are principally located on
the Mexican side of the region running along the U.S.-Mexico
border from Tijuana to Matamoros.12 Under the maquiladora
program, Mexico does not impose tariffs and customs duties on
input materials, equipment, and machinery designated for production in a maquiladora.13 This duty-free status is subject to a
guarantee by the company that the finished product will eventually be exported back to the country from which the parts and
components originated.' 4 Upon export back to the United
foreign ownership in Mexican companies is prohibited. Ley para Promover la
Inversi6n Mexicana y Regular la Inversi6n Extranjera, D.O., Mar. 19, 1973, cited
in Cheryl Schechter & David Brill, Jr., Maquiladoras: Will the ProgramContinue? 23 ST. MARY'S L.J. 697, 702 n.23 (1992). Prior to the passage of the Foreign Investment Law in 1973, the Mexican government restricted foreign
investment under Art. 27 of the Mexican Constitution. MEX. CONST. art. 27,
cited in Schechter & Brill, supra, at 702.
10. Mexican labor costs are substantially lower than those in the United
States. Malissa H. McKeith, Environmental Provisions Affecting Businesses
on the US./Mexico Border, 15 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 245 (Apr. 22, 1992) [hereinafter BNA Environmental Provisions].
11. Coproduction systems essentially split the manufacturing process between two or more countries. This creates a more efficient and economical
means of manufacturing by minimizing the cost of each resource. By combining
each country's human, natural, and technical resources, coproduction systems
allow transnational companies to expand profit margins and compete more effectively in global markets. Valdez, supra note 2, at 393-94.
12. Most maquiladoras are located within 14 Mexican Cities. Each of these
cities is one of a pair of sister cities, with one city on each side of the U.S.Mexico border. These sister cities include: Tijuana, Baja California and San
Diego, California; Mexicali, Baja California and Calixico, California; San Luis
Rio Colorado, Sonora and Yuma, Arizona; Nogales, Sonora and Nogales, Arizona; Agua Prieta, Sonora and Douglas, Arizona; Naco, Sonora and Naco, Arizona; Las Palomas, Chihuahua and Colombus, New Mexico; Ciudad Juarez,
Chihuahua and El Paso, Texas; Ojinaga, Chihuahua and Presidio, Texas; Ciudad
Acuna, Coahuila and Del Rio, Texas; Piedras Negras, Coahuila and Eagle Pass,
Texas; Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas and Laredo, Texas; Reynosa, Tamaulipas and
McAllen, Texas; and Matamoros, Tamaulipas and Brownsville, Texas. EPA
BORDER PLAN SUMMARY, supra note 3, at 7.
13. This is a direct incentive provided by the Government of Mexico to encourage continued growth in the maquiladora industry. Recognizing the economic advantages that come with further development, Mexico has employed a
variety of such incentives to encourage U.S. investment in co-production activities. Valdez, supra note 2, at 394, 399-400.
14. Schechter & Brill, supra note 9, at 698. Companies must also post a
bond as part of the guarantee that finished products will be exported. Malissa
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States, the U.S. government applies a duty only to the value ad5
ded in Mexico, and not to the U.S.-source content.'
The maquiladora program was originally conceived in Customs Code interpretations by the Mexican Secretaries of Commerce and Treasury in 1965.16 The maquiladora industry has
been economically successful since its conception, and has especially thrived in the past ten years. Much of the industry's recent success can be attributed to the Mexican economy's shift
toward export-oriented manufacturing during the late 1970s and
early 1980s. 17 Several presidential decrees have modified the nature, scope, and objectives of the maquiladora program.' The
1989 Decree, currently in effect, emphasizes the following objectives: generating employment and attracting foreign currency,
fostering regional development and industrial decentralization,
and facilitating the transfer and development of technology. 19

B. FUTURE OF THE PROGRAM
As NAFTA eliminates tariffs and foreign ownership restrictions,20 American owned manufacturing plants in Mexico will
H. McKeith, The Environment and Free Trade: Meeting Halfway at the Mexican Border, 10 PAC. BASIN L.J. 183, 185 (1991). Due to the bond requirement,
the maquiladora industry is often referred to as Mexico's "In-Bond Industry."
15. 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (item numbers 806.30 and 807.00). Item Number 807.00
provides that tariffs are to be assessed in accordance with "the full value of the
imported articles less the cost or value of such products of the U.S.." Id. Value
added typically consists of labor, rent, utilities, and any additional raw materials. Schechter & Brill, supra note 9, at 699 n.5.
16. Schechter & Brill, supra note 9, at 701. The original program focused
specifically on border development. It required that a Mexican company be
formed to operate individual plants, but allowed full ownership of the Mexican
corporation by foreigners. Id, at 702.
17. During this period, Mexico experienced an economic crises precipitated
by an extreme drop in the international oil market. Realizing that it could no
longer depend on oil exports as the primary source of foreign currency, Mexico
encouraged greater integration of the maquiladora industry into its national
economy. The ensuing reconstruction of the Mexican economy resulted in the
expansion of manufacturing for export. Id. at 698.
18. Id. at 702-04. Since the original 1965 decree, the maquiladora program
has been modified by additional decrees in 1972 (eliminating geographic limitations), 1977 (expanding the program's application by altering national content
restrictions), 1983 (encouraging greater integration into the national economy),
and 1989 (facilitating the development of a domestic supplier and subcontractor
network). Id.
19. Decreto para el Fomento y Operaci6n de la Industria Maquiladora de
Exportaci6n, D.O., Dec. 20, 1989, cited in Schechter & Brill, supra note 9, at 704
n.36.
20. NAFTA provides for the elimination of customs duties in Article
302(2), and for equal treatment of foreign investment in Article 1102.

1993]

MAQULADORAS AND

NAFTA

no longer benefit from the duty-free importation of raw materials that is accorded by the maquiladora program.2 1 The tariff

phase-out period for NAFTA will be gradual, however, with full
duty elimination for certain tariff items scheduled as late as January 1, 2008.22 During the initial periods of tariff elimination, it

will be profitable for maquiladora owners to continue to take
advantage of the reduced tariff rates charged when re-importing
finished products into the United States. As a result, the maquiladora program will remain advantageous to transnational companies for a number of years. This will be true so long as the
duties charged on value added remain lower than the duties prescribed by the NAFTA's phase-out schedule.
After tariffs are completely phased-out, the foreign manufacturing industry in Mexico is likely to continue to expand as
more companies move production facilities to Mexico. 23 The
economic incentives for American manufacturers to locate in
Mexico will endure so long as Mexican labor remains relatively
inexpensive.
C.

THE MAQUILADORA PROBLEM

Recently, the maquiladora industry has received substantial
attention from environmentalists because the border area,
where most maquiladoras are located, has been plagued by environmental problems. 24 The illegal disposal of hazardous waste
21.

In addition to American owned maquiladoras, there are a significant

number of Japanese, Korean, Taiwanese, and German owned maquiladoras.
NAFTA will have no direct effect on the maquiladora program as it relates to
these and other non-party maquiladoras. Telephone Interview with Jaime
Palafox, Assistant of the Environmental Office of the Embassy of Mexico,
Washington, D.C. (Oct. 22, 1992). Even if non-party maquiladora owners were
to reap incidental benefits from NAFTA Rules of Origin changes, ownership
and exportation requirements will remain the same. Id Because these restrictions will continue to exist for non-party maquiladoras, the full implementation
of NAFTA does not signal the end of the maquiladora program in Mexico.
22. NAFTA, Tariff Schedules, Phase-Out Schedule, Staging Category C15.
NAFTA provides for the gradual reduction and eventual phase-out of tariffs for
goods travelling between the United States, Mexico, and Canada. NAFTA addresses approximately 9,000 tariff items, with about 50% to be eliminated immediately, 15% to be phased out over a five year period, and the remaining items to
be eliminated over a six to 15 year period. PresidentBush Announces NAFTA
Accord, but Labor, Others Promise Renewed Attack, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
1375 (Aug. 12, 1992).
23. Michael Scott Feeley & Elizabeth Knier, Environmental Considerations of the Emerging United States-Mexico Free Trade Agreement, 2 DuKE J.
COMP.& INT'L L. 259, 276 (1992).
24. Among the environmental problems attributed to the maquiladora industry are steadily worsening air quality in the border region, and contamina-
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from maquiladoras has become commonplace,25 and has resulted
in dangerous living conditions in Mexican towns where maquiladoras are located, and in American colonias. 26 One commonly
cited horror story tells of large numbers of babies being born
with missing or incomplete brains near maquiladoras. 27 This is
allegedly caused by mothers' consumption of untreated water
coming from sources near the maquiladoras.2 8
As many urban areas along the border developed rapidly,
centralized wastewater collection and treatment systems were
never built.29 This has resulted in the vast discharge of untreated or inadequately treated wastewater into rivers, canals,
arroyos, 30 the Gulf of Mexico, and the Pacific Ocean. 31 An
American Medical Association report, released in 1990, characterized the border region as a "virtual cesspool and breeding
ground for infectious disease," and warned that "[u]ncontrolled
air and water pollution is rapidly deteriorating and seriously affecting the health and future economic vitality on both sides of
tion of water supplies due to improper and illegal disposal of hazardous wastes.
Id.at 274-75.
25. See, e.g., U.S.-Mexico Border: Thousands of Hazardous Waste Drums
Prompt Investigation, 15 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 569 (Sept. 9, 1992).
26. Colonias are small American border towns located immediately across
the border from maquiladoras. Because environmental conditions in most
colonias are as poor as those across the border in Mexico, these conditions constitute a significant part of the maquiladora problem.
27. Special Report: North American Free Trade Agreement Greeted with
Suspicion by Environmental Groups, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) Sept. 10, 1992, at
*29-30, availablein WESTLAW, BNA-BTD Database [hereinafter BNA NAFTA
Report]. This phenomenon is known as anencephaly, and has been occurring
with alarming frequency in Matamoros, Tamaulipas and Brownsville, Texas.
Non-environmental Causes Investigated in Anencephaly Outbreak on Border,
Int'l Envtl. Daily (BNA) Oct. 15,1992, at *2, availablein WESTLAW, BNA-IED
Database [hereinafter BNA Anencephaly Report].
28. Lawyers Say Otpposition to Fast Track Mounts in U.S. Congress, NOTIMEX Mexican News Service, May 10, 1992, at *3, availablein LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Omni File. This is only a theory, however, and studies to detect nonenvironmental causes of the anencephaly outbreak are currently being conducted. BNA Anencephaly Report, supra note 27, at *2.
29. EPA BORDER PLAN SUMMARY, supra note 3, at 11. Currently, Mexico's
urban areas (particularly those along the border) lack adequate sewage systems,
waste disposal facilities, pollution control equipment, and other basic structural
components. Feeley & Knier, supra note 23, at 272.
30. An arroyo is a small stream, or brook.
31. EPA BORDER PLAN SUMMARY, supra note 3, at 12. While much of this
pollution may be attributed directly to the border plants themselves, a significant portion may be attributed only indirectly, as the results of the rapid urbanization that has accompanied the growth of the maquiladora industry. "Waste
... generated by humans is a formidable component of the pollution stream."
Feeley & Knier, supra note 23, at 273.
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the border. ' 32 In addition, industrial facilities, most of which are
maquiladoras, currently release a range of toxic air pollutants
into the atmosphere, further contributing to deteriorating air
quality along the border.33
The environmental problems among the maquiladoras can
be attributed to several causes such as non-compliance with existing environmental regulations, s4 lax enforcement by Mexican
authorities,35 and the lack of an adequate infrastructure necessary to treat and dispose of hazardous waste3s While these
problems are complex and diverse, they can all be traced to a
common source: the lack of economic resources available in
Mexico to adequately control the environmental effects of development in the border region.3 7
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND AND REGULATORY
SCHEME
A comprehensive environmental regulatory structure exists
in Mexico in the form of domestic laws, agency regulation, and
international agreements. As serious as the maquiladora problem is, it does not result from a lack of regulation. The Mexican
government has particularly shown an increasing commitment
to the environment in the past ten years.
A.

THE GENERAL LAW OF ECOLOGICAL EQUILIBRIUM AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

The General Law of Ecological Equilibrium and Environ32. Michael Satchell, Poisoning the Border,U.S. NEWS & WORLD

REPORT,

May 6, 1991, at 34, cited in Michael Conner, Maquiladorasand the BorderEnvi-

ronment Prospectsfor Moving from Agreements to Solutions, 3 COLO. J. INT'L
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 683, 683 (1992).
33. EPA BORDER PLAN SUMMARY, supra note 3, at 12. The air quality
problems along the border can also be attributed to a number of other factors in
addition to the maquiladoras. The sister cities are subject to many of the same
air quality problems typical of densely populated urban areas. Id.
34. Strong environmental laws and adequate enforcement are necessary to
prevent companies from migrating to Mexico to avoid environmental compliance costs. NAFTA: Reilley Says NAFTA May Be First Trade Pact with SustainableDevelopment as a Goal, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1386 (Aug. 13, 1992).
35. Id.
36. NAFTA May Bring 'Import' of Pollution to Mexico, J. Com. (Reuter)
Aug. 20, 1992, at *2, available in WESTLAW, JOC Database.
37. "Lack of funding is the root of Mexican and United States environmental concerns." Feeley & Knier, supra note 23, at 292. See also Conner, supra
note 32, at 699.
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mental Protection (the General Ecology Law), 31 passed in 1988,
is a comprehensive environmental law that provides the primary
structure of environmental regulation and enforcement in Mexico. 39 The law is patterned after U.S. environmental legislation
in both substance and structure, and is effectuated through a decentralized system in which local authorities have the responsibility to ensure compliance. 40 The General Ecology Law
regulates air, water, soil, and natural resources; requires prior
authorization for any activity that causes ecological disequilibrium; and is enforced through a series of technical ecologi41
cal norms.
Preventing and controlling water, air, and soil pollution is a
fundamental goal of the General Ecology Law, 42 and this makes
it particularly relevant to problems in the border region and
among the maquiladoras. This law requires each facility to comply with a variety of guidelines regarding the generation, storage, transportation and disposal of hazardous waste. 43 In
particular, it requires that all hazardous waste generated by maquiladoras be returned to the country of origin. 44
38. General Law of Ecological Equilibrium and Environmental Protection,
D.O. Jan. 28, 1988 cited in Conner, supra note 32, at 691 n.54.
39. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, U.S. SENATE,
U.S.-MExICO TRADE: ASSESSMENT OF MEXICO'S ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLS

FOR NEW COMPAINES 2 (Aug. 1992) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
40. Edward M. Ranger, Jr., Environmental Regulation and Enforcement
in Mexico, at 2, reprintedfrom Maquiladora Industry Annual Review (Seguros
de Mexico 1991) (on file with the Minnesota Journal of Global Trade). The
General Ecology Law itself is federal in scope, with federal authorities empowered to apply and enforce regulations. The intent, however, is to rely on local
authorities to monitor compliance. In addition, the General Ecology Law allows
state and municipal regulations to exist within its field of application. Id.
41. BNA Environmental Provisions,supra note 10, at 245.
42. Other fundamental goals include the prevention of the over-exploitation of non-renewable resources, and the prevention of noise, vibration, and
thermal pollution. EMBASSY OF MEXICO, MEXICO ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES -

FACT SHEETS 9 (Sept. 1992) (on file with the Minnesota Journal of Global

Trade).
43. McKeith, supra note 14, at 189-92. These requirements mandate that
each facility: (1) obtain an environmental operating license; (2) file an Environmental Impact Statement (if one is required); (3) register residual wastewater
discharge; (4) register the generation of hazardous waste; (5) obtain Ecological
Manifests (tracking forms) for the transportation of hazardous materials; (6)
store hazardous materials in approved facilities; and (7) follow a series of reporting and record-keeping requirements. Id.
44. Conner, supra note 32, at 692. This requirement is also referred to in
the La Paz Agreement. See also note 74, infra, and accompanying text.
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AGENCY REGULATION

The General Ecology Law of 1988 delegates the responsibility for the formulation and enforcement of environmental policy
to the recently created Secretariat of Social Development
(SEDESOL). 45 The Mexican Congress approved the creation of
SEDESOL in May 1992 as part of an initiative to concentrate the
responsibilities of several social institutions in one agency. 46 In
addition to policymaking, monitoring, and enforcement,
SEDESOL performs administrative functions such as channel47
ing funds for the development of infrastructure projects.
Two agencies which focus exclusively on the environment
fall under SEDESOL's authority. 48 The National Institute of
Ecology is primarily responsible for analyzing and formulating
Mexico's environmental policy. 49 The Office of the Attorney

General for Protection of the Environment is responsible for the
enforcement of environmental regulations formulated by the
National Institute of Ecology, the investigation and punishment
of non-compliance with environmental regulations, and the facilitation of public participation in environmental measures. 5°

SEDESOL grants these agencies a degree of technical and opera-

51
tive autonomy to aid them in fulfilling their functions.

The General Ecology Law requires prospective owners and
operators of new companies, or existing companies planning significant changes, to receive advance authorization from
SEDESOL. Authorization is obtained first by submitting a
45. Originally, this responsibility was given to the Secretariat of Urban Development and Ecology (SEDUE). On May 26, 1992, however, SEDESOL was

formed with the intent that it perform all environmental functions previously
handled by SEDUE. GAO REPORT, supra note 39, at 2. SEDESOL has now
completely replaced SEDUE.
46. SECRETARIA DE DESARROLLO SocIAL, SEDESOL 1 (1992) (pamphlet on
file with the Minnesota Journalof Global Trade) [hereinafter SEDESOL Pamphlet]. This reorganization was the result of an initiative by the Federal Executive. Id.
47. GAO REPORT, supra note 39, at 2.
48. EMBASSY OF MEXICO, SEDESOL's FIRST 100 DAYS: A RECORD OF ENViRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT 1 (1992) (pamphlet distributed by the Embassy of
Mexico) [hereinafter SEDESOL's FIRST 100 DAYS].
49. Id. These responsibilities fall within the categories of ecological planning, environmental standards, ecological exploitation of natural resources, and
technological research and development. SEDESOL Pamphlet, supra note 46,
at 2.
50. SEDESOL's FIRST 100 DAYS, supra note 48, at 1.
51. SEDESOL Pamphlet, supra note 46, at 2. This type of autonomy serves
the purpose of preventing bureaucratic stagnation, political corruption, and
other potential problems associated with the political capture of government
agencies.
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"Dictamen de Viabilidad" (feasibility assessment),5 2 and then
submitting an Environmental Impact Appraisal (EIA) if
SEDESOL determines that the project's environmental risk
warrants one. 53 If an EIA is required, it must be conducted by a
registered environmental consultant. 54
Maquiladoras are also specifically regulated by the Secretariat of Commerce and Industrial Promotion (SECOFI), a coordinating agency for the maquiladora program. SECOFI is
responsible for ensuring that maquiladoras initiate the EIA process and comply with other SEDESOL requirements.5 5 In order
to participate in the maquiladora program, a company must reupon
ceive a license from SECOFI. 56 This license is conditioned
57
compliance with applicable environmental legislation.
C. THE LA PAZ AGREEMENT
In addition to traditional forms of regulation by domestic
legislation and agency supervision, the maquiladora industry is
significantly affected by international environmental agreements. The most important of these, the Agreement Between
the United States of America and the United Mexican States on
Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area 8 (the La Paz Agreement) was
signed by President Ronald Reagan and President Miguel de la
Madrid on August 14, 1983, in the City of La Paz, Baja California, Mexico. This agreement sets forth general goals for environmental protection along the border and provides a
foundation for the cooperative fulfillment of those goals. In the
La Paz Agreement, the "border area" is defined as any territory
52. A Dictamen de Viabilidad is a summary describing the planned location
and operation of the company. GAO REPORT, supra note 39, at 11.
53. This determination is based upon information contained in the
Dictamen de Viabilidad. Id If SEDESOL determines that a project will not
substantially affect the environment, the company will be requested to submit
an "Informe Preventivo" (preventative report). I&
54. McKeith, supra note 14, at 190.
55. GAO REPORT, supra note 39, at 12.
56. To obtain this license, the company must provide SECOFI with a copy
of the EIA, Dictamen de Viabilidad, or Informe Preventivo with a stamp showing that it has been received by SEDESOL. This ensures that a license will not
be issued without initiating SEDESOL's authorization procedures. Id
57. Environmental Regulation and Enforcement in Mexico, supra note 40,
at 6.
58. Agreement Between the United States of America and the United
Mexican States on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area, Aug. 14, 1983, U.S.-Mex., T.I.A.S. No. 10827, reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 1025 (1983) [hereinafter La Paz Agreement].

1993]

MAQUILADORAS AND

NAFTA

within 100 kilometers of the inland and maritime boundaries be59
tween the United States and Mexico.
The provisions of the La Paz Agreement are general in nature and primarily outline the administration of cooperative efforts. Article 8 designates the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) as the national coordinator for the United States,
and SEDESOL as the national coordinator for Mexico. 60 As national coordinators, these agencies have the responsibility to "coordinate and monitor implementation of this agreement, make
recommendations to the Parties, and organize the annual
'61
meetings."
Specific arrangements for the solutions of environmental
problems are to be added to the La Paz Agreement through formal annexes as the need arises.62 To date, the agreement has
been supplemented with five annexes relating to specific
problems.
Annex I, Agreement of Cooperation for Solution of the Border Sanitation Problem at San Diego, California - Tijuana, Baja
California, was signed on July 18, 1985.63 This Annex addresses
sanitation problems at the border between San Diego and Tijuana, and provides for consultations between the U.S. and Mexican governments regarding a proposed waste-water treatment
64
facility.
Annex II, Agreement of Cooperation Regarding Pollution
of the Environment Along the Inland International Boundary
by Discharges of Hazardous Substances, was also signed on July
59. Id. art. 4.
60. Id. art. 8. The agreement actually designates SEDUE as the Mexican
National Coordinator, but SEDESOL has since taken over all functions of
SEDUE. See supra note 45.
61. Id. art. 8. Additional responsibilities are to be determined by agreement in subsequent annexes to the La Paz Agreement. Id.
62. 1d art. 3, which states as follows: "Pursuant to this Agreement, the
Parties may conclude specific arrangements for the solution of common
problems in the border area, which may be annexed thereto. Similarly, the
Parties may also agree upon annexes to this Agreement on technical matters."
63. Annex I to the Agreement Between the United States of America and
the United Mexican States on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement
of the Environment in the Border Area - Agreement of Cooperation for Solution of the Border Sanitation Problem at San Diego, California-Tijuana, Baja
California, July 18, 1985, U.S.-Mex., 26 I.L.M. 18 (1987) [hereinafter Annex I].

64. This treatment facility has only recently received U.S. funding approval. A proposed bill provides $32.5 million for its construction in 1992. EPA,
Congress Sends EPA Funding Bill to the President Hill Aide Says, Daily Rep.
for Execs. (BNA) Sept. 30, 1992, at *7, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni
File.
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18, 1985.65 This annex provides working definitions of the concepts of "polluting incidents," "environment" and "hazardous
substances."6 6 It establishes a "Joint Contingency Plan" to deal
with polluting incidents, 67 and a "Joint Response Team" to advise, evaluate, and make recommendations regarding specific
polluting incidents. 6 8 The goal of this annex is to improve detection and response measures to polluting incidents. 69
65. Annex IIto the Agreement Between the United States of America and
the United Mexican States on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement
of the Environment in the Border Area - Agreement Between the United
States of America and the United Mexican States Regarding Pollution of the
Environment Along the Inland International Boundary by Discharges of Hazardous Substances, July 18,1985, U.S.-Mex., 26 I.L.M. 19 (1987) [hereinafter Annex II].
66. Id art. I provides in pertinent part:
For the purposes of this Agreement:
(a) "A polluting incident" means a discharge or the threat of a discharge of any hazardous substance on one side of the inland international boundary of a magnitude which causes, or threatens to cause
imminent and substantial adverse effects on the public health, welfare,
or the environment.
(b) "Environment" means the atmosphere, land, and surface and
ground water, including the natural resources therein, such as fish,
wildlife, forests, crop and rangeland, rivers, streams, aquifers and all
other components of the ecosystem.
(c) "Hazardous substances" means elements and compounds which if
discharged present or may present an imminent and substantial danger
to the public health, welfare or the environment according to the laws
of each party and the determination of the Joint Response Team
(JRT). The JRT and its responsibilities are defined in Appendix II.
67. The purpose of this plan is to devise workable cooperative measures to
effectively respond to polluting incidents. Id. art. II.
68. Id. art. II, appendix II, 2.6 provides in pertinent part:
When the two Parties have agreed to initiate a joint response to a polluting incident, the functions and responsibilities of the JRT will be
the following(a) Based on the OSC's ['on scene coordinator'] initial notification, advise the OSC ...about measures needed to respond to the incident and
what resources . . . are available to carry out those measures.
(b) To evaluate and make recommendations concerning the measures
taken by the OSC.
(c) To provide continuing advice to the OSC.
(d) To consider the journal and reports of the OSC and recommend
to the National Coordinators improvements needed in the Plan.
(e) Based on the reports of the OSC, to assess the possible impacts of
the polluting incident and to recommend measures necessary to mitigate the adverse effects of such incident.
(f) To take measures to coordinate and use to the maximum the resources which agencies or persons of the United States of America, or
of the United Mexican States, or of a third party can contribute.
69. McKeith, supra note 14, at 193. Annex II is particularly relevant to the
regulation of maquiladoras because certain incidents of illegal disposal or accidental discharge of hazardous wastes by maquiladoras in the border area qualify
as "polluting incidents" within the meaning of this Annex.

1993"1

MAQUILADOwRAs AND

NAFTA

Annex III, Agreement of Cooperation Regarding the Transboundary Shipments of Hazardous Wastes and Hazardous Substances, was signed on November 12, 1986.70 This annex
provides a legal and procedural framework for the transborder
shipment of hazardous substances, and monitors and regulates
these shipments in a manner designed not to interfere with bilateral trade. 71 Specifically, it provides for notifications regarding the shipment of hazardous substances, 72 and notifications
regarding restrictive regulatory actions. 73 Maquiladoras are specifically addressed in Article XI, which provides that
"[h]azardous waste generated in the processes of economic production, manufacturing, processing or repair, for which raw
materials were utilized and temporarily admitted, shall continue
to be readmitted by the country of origin of the raw materials in
accordance with applicable national policies, laws and
'74
regulations.
Annex IV, Agreement of Cooperation Regarding Transboundary Air Pollution Caused by Copper Smelters Along [the]
Common Border, was signed on January 29, 1987. 75 This annex
70. Annex III to the Agreement Between the United States of America
and the United Mexican States on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area - Agreement of Cooperation
Between the United States of America and the United Mexican States Regarding the Transboundary Shipments of Hazardous Wastes and Hazardous Substances, Nov. 12, 1986, U.S.-Mex., 26 I.L.M. 25 (1987) [hereinafter Annex III].
71. Environmental Regulation and Enforcement in Mexico, supranote 40,
at 7. Annex III is the only part of the La Paz Agreement that expressly links
environmental regulation with trade obligations. In its preamble, Annex III
recognizes that "the close trading relationship and the long common border between the Parties make it necessary to cooperate regarding transboundary shipments of hazardous waste and hazardous substances without unreasonably
affecting the trade of goods and services." Annex III, supra note 70.
72. Annex III, supra note 70, art. VI. This notification contains the name
of the hazardous substance, the approximate date(s) of export, information regarding regulatory action, and the name and address of the contact point. Id
art. VI, 3.
73. Id,art. V. This notification contains the name of the substance that has
been regulated, a summary of the regulatory action, a summary of the reason
for the regulatory action, information regarding any alternative substances, and
the name and address of the contact point. Id. art. V: 2.
74. Id. art. XI. Because Annex III, Article XI addresses readmission into
the country of origin of raw materials, rather than shipment from the maquiladoras, it is unclear whether it mandates that all hazardous wastes from maquiladoras be returned to the country of origin. The maquiladoras themselves
had not taken this as a mandate. Conner, supra note 32, at 689-90. The General
Ecology Law, however, has subsequently clarified this ambiguity by expressly
requiring that each plant return all hazardous wastes to the country in which
the materials originated. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
75. Annex IV to the Agreement Between the United States of America and
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limits sulphur dioxide emissions of specific smelters, 76 and coordinates a monitoring, recordkeeping and reporting system for
the smelters.77
Annex V, Agreement of Cooperation Regarding International Transport of Urban Air Pollution, was signed on October
3, 1989.78 This annex calls for each party to initiate studies to
identify and manage emissions of pollutants from specific stationary sources. 79 In addition, Annex V calls on each party to
jointly explore ways to harmonize air pollution control standards and ambient air quality standards.8 0
In Mexico, the La Paz Agreement has been ineffective in
improving the monitoring and enforcement of regulations governing the disposal of hazardous wastes. Despite the regulatory
scheme outlined in Annex III, Mexico has made little headway
in pursuance of this goal.81 A major reason for this lack of progress is the deficiency of tracking procedures.8 2 A common practhe United Mexican States on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement
of the Environment in the Border Area - Agreement of Cooperation Between

the United States of America and the United Mexican States Regarding Transboundary Air Pollution Caused by Copper Smelters Along Their Common Border, July 29, 1987, U.S.-Mex., 26 I.L.M. 33 (1987) [hereinafter Annex IV]. As a
remedial measure aimed at two specific copper smelters, Annex IV has no regulatory effect on the maquiladora industry.
76. The smelters are the Phelps Dodge copper smelter in Douglas, Arizona
and the Mexicana de Cobre la Caridad copper smelter in Nacozari, Sonora. Id.
art. 1(1),(3).

77. Id. art. II.
78. Annex V to the Agreement Between the United States of America and
the United Mexican States on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement
of the Environment in the Border Area - Agreement of Cooperation Between
the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the
United Mexican States Regarding International Transport of Urban Air Pollution, Oct. 3, 1989, U.S.-Mex., 29 I.L.M. 29 (1990) [hereinafter Annex V]. Annex
V may ultimately have a great deal of effect on the maquiladora industry, because maquiladoras are the type of emission sources that the Annex addresses.
Id.
79. Id Article II outlines the general obligations of each party to identify
the location, magnitude and type of pollutants in their respective territories.
Articles III and IV create obligations regarding the compiling of information
and monitoring of emissions.
80. Id. art. V provides in pertinent part: "In order to make more effective
the implementation of this Annex, the Parties shall jointly explore ways to harmonize, as appropriate, their air pollution control standards and ambient air
quality standards in accordance with their respective legal procedures."
81. Elizabeth C. Rose, Transboundary Harm: Hazardous Waste Management Problems and Mexico's Maquiladoras,23 INT'L LAw. 223, 240 (1989).
82. After raw materials are initially shipped from the United States, proving that they reach their proper destination and that the wastes subsequently
generated are properly managed is virtually impossible. Id at 241.
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tice of local waste disposal companies has been to simply remove
waste-filled drums from maquiladoras and dump them into municipal or private landfills, or directly into urban sewage systems. 3 One particularly horrifying report alleges that recycled
hazardous waste drums are being sold to Mexican citizens, who
use them for the storage of drinking water.84
While the La Paz Agreement and its annexes have addressed a significant number of environmental problems in the
border area, they have also been criticized for their failure to
effectively deter maquiladoras from blatantly disregarding environmental regulations8s In response to this criticism, EPA officials have pointed to insufficient funding. 86 A second deficiency
with the La Paz Agreement is the conspicuous absence of enforcement provisions. While the goals of the agreement are ambitious, its terms are often qualified with language such as "to
the fullest extent practical."87 In addition, the agreement explicitly states that "[a]ctivities under this agreement shall be
subject to the availability of funds and other resources to each
Party and to the applicable laws and regulations in each country. '8 8 These passages indicate that the La Paz Agreement is
merely a cooperative attempt to solve environmental problems,
and has little binding force. As the continued existence of the
maquiladora problem demonstrates, the La Paz Agreement and
its annexes are a disappointing precedent among cooperative environmental efforts between the United States and Mexico.
III.

NAFTA AS A SOLUTION TO THE MAQUILADORA
PROBLEM

During preliminary negotiations leading up to NAFTA, en83. H. Jeffrey Leonard, Confronting IndustrialPollution in Rapidly Industrializing Countries: Myths, Pitfalls and Opportunities, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q.
779, 799 (1985). Few company officials candidly admit that this type of disposal
occurs. Most of these companies, however, are unable to account for the final
destinations of waste drums that are taken from their plants. Id.
84. Jane Juffer, Dump at the Border, PROGRFSSIVE, Oct. 1988, at 24, 28.
85. McKeith, supra note 14, at 194. In addition, the practical effectiveness
of the La Paz Agreement and its Annexes has been the subject of doubt. Id.

n.50.
86. This response came from Enrique Manzanilla, U.S.-Mexico Border Coordinator, Water Management Division, EPA Region IX, and is cited in McKeith, supra note 14, at 194.
87. See, for example, La Paz Agreement, Article 2: "The Parties undertake, to the fullest extent practical,to adopt the appropriate measures to pre-

vent, reduce and eliminate sources of pollution...." La Paz Agreement, supra
note 58, art. 2 (emphasis added).
88. Id. art. 18.
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vironmentalists hoped that the agreement would directly adIn
particular,
the
maquiladora
problem.8 9
dress
environmentalists had hoped that NAFTA would consider lax
environmental regulations and enforcement to be unfair trade
practices, and provide enforcement mechanisms to compel a
party to take measures to protect the environment. 90
Two concerns explain the interest of the U.S. government
and American citizens in compelling Mexico to protect and improve its domestic environmental conditions. The first concern
is economic - U.S. business interests have expressed concern that
manufacturers will relocate to Mexico in order to avoid high
compliance costs with domestic environmental regulations.9 1 If
lower environmental compliance costs actually do play a role in
decisions to relocate, 92 encouraging investment through non-enforcement of environmental regulations may constitute an un93
fair trade advantage for Mexico.
89. Even after NAFTA has been signed, the governments of the United
States, Mexico, and Canada continue to receive criticism for the perceived failure to consult environmental organizations during NAFTA negotiations.
NAFTA - Mexican Groups Gearup for Talks on EnvironmentalIssues Related
to Pact, Int'l Envtl. Daily (BNA), Feb. 23, 1993, at *9, available in WESTLAW,
BNA-IED Database.
90. AMERIcAN CETACEAN SOCIETY, ET AL., RESPONSE OF ENVIRONMENTAL
AND CONSUMER ORGANIZATIONS TO THE SEPTEhMER 6, 1992 TEXT OF NAFTA 4

(Alex Hittle & Scott Nilson eds., Oct. 6, 1992) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL
REPORT].

91. NAFTA Provides Wrong Business Incentives, Witnesses Tell House
Small Business Panel, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) Sept. 22, 1992, at *18-19, available in WESTLAW, BNA-BTD Database.
92. There is considerable disagreement as to whether or not environmental
compliance costs are high enough to become an influential factor in a company's
decision to relocate. Id. According to the Bush Administration summary of
NAFTA:
Compliance costs play a minimal role in relocation decisions because
they represent a small share of total costs for most industries. Indeed,
86 percent of U.S. industries have abatement costs of 2 percent or less.
Moreover, most U.S. industries with high compliance costs already
have low tariffs, so NAFTA would give them little incentive to relocate
to Mexico.
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, DESCRIPTION OF THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, (Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter NAFTA Summary].

Even if compliance costs are not high enough to influence an existing manufacturer's decision to relocate, however, they may be significant enough to influence the decision of where a new manufacturing plant should be located. If
this is true, a trade advantage exists for countries that do not enforce environmental regulations.
93. Industries in developed countries have commonly complained that they
are at a disadvantage when competing with industries with less stringent environmental regulations. Geoffrey W. Levin, The Environment and Trade - A
MultilateralImperative, 1 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 231, 234 (1992).
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The second concern is environmental - beyond the immediate concern that environmentally dangerous conditions at the
border will spill over into the United States, modern environmental theory has a global rather than a national focus. As a
concept, environmentalism transcends national boundaries. Accordingly, environmentalists throughout the world are as concerned about environmental problems in Mexico as they are
about those in the United States. 94 If the Mexican government
is unwilling or unable to protect the environment within its own
territory, public and private environmental organizations will
naturally look elsewhere to find solutions to environmental
problems. If, under NAFTA, the U.S. government has the
power to compel action by Mexican authorities, environmentalists will certainly pressure it to do so. 95
Although NAFTA does not go this far, it does recognize environmental concerns in several provisions. NAFTA has been
hailed by the Bush Administration as "the greenest ever" among
free trade agreements. 96 This is not a very strong statement,
however, given that previous trade agreements have rarely addressed environmental issues. 97 In fact, the nature of NAFTA's
environmental provisions is limited, and NAFTA offers little
that will lead to solutions to the maquiladora problem.
A.

ARTICULATED GOALS

The preamble of NAFTA, which lists the general results
94. Because environmental problems are oblivious to national boundaries,
it matters little whether the environmental problems caused by the maquiladoras are in Mexico or the United States. "Nature's writs are ubiquitous and
universal. The laws of Nature give rise to identical bio-physical reactions in Los
Angeles, Birmingham, Dusseldorf, Oslo, or Auckland. When discharges of
wastes or residuals lead to pollution, common bio-physical reactions take place
regardless of where in the world the environment is abused." Lakshman
Guruswamy, IntegratingPollution Controk The Way Forward,7 ARiz. J. INT'L
& CoMP. L. 173, 185 (1990).
95. When environmental protection is at stake, it matters little to environmental organizations what the source of that protection may be. Throughout
the NAFTA negotiations, for example, environmental organizations pressured
the Bush Administration to include provisions that would affect environmental
conditions within Mexico. See, e.g., NAFTA - Public Citizen Says NAFTA Summary is 'Little More Than Greenwash', Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) Aug. 24, 1992,
at *15, available in WESTLAW, BNA-BTD Database.
96. Linda Fisher, EPA Assistant Administrator for Prevention, Pesticides,
and Toxic Substances, described NAFTA as "perhaps the greenest trade agreement ever negotiated in the world." NAFTA: U.S.-Mexico Environmental Accord Expected to Be Signed Soon, FisherSays, Int'l Envtl. Daily (BNA) Sept. 14,
1992, at *9, available in WESTLAW, BNA-IED Database.
97. ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, supra note 90, at 1.
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that the parties to the agreement hope to achieve, contains specific references to environmental safety. These references include the resolve to:
-"UNDERTAKE each of the [other goals] in a manner consistent with environmental protection and conservation";
-"PROMOTE sustainable development"; and
-"STRENGTHEN the development and enforcement of environmental laws and regulations."98s
As declarations in a preamble, these provisions are merely
general statements and have little, if any, regulatory force.9
NAFTA supporters have consistently referred to these statements, however, as reflecting a strong commitment to environmental safety. 1°° Whether or not such a commitment exists, its
existence does not necessarily mean that affirmative steps will
be taken to realize articulated goals.
B. REINFORCEMENT OF EXISTING AGREEMENTS
Article 104 of NAFTA lists certain currently existing international environmental agreements that will take precedence
over NAFTA should a conflict between NAFTA and the provisions of the respective agreements arise. 01' The agreements that
may affect the maquiladoras include:
1) The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer, 0 2
2) The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, 0 3 and
98. NAFTA, pmbl.
99. Although statements in a preamble are not normally binding, they do
have a degree of interpretive force. According to Art. 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the preamble of a treaty is relevant in determining
the context and purpose of the agreement should a dispute regarding the interpretation of terms arise. Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties, art. 31,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf.39/27, May 23, 1969.
100. See, for example, NAFTA Summary, supra note 92, at 44: "The three
NAFTA countries have committed in the NAFTA to implementing the Agreement in a manner consistent with environmental protection and to promoting
sustainable development. Specific provisions throughout the Agreement build
upon these commitments."
101. NAFTA, art. 104.
102. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept.
16, 1987, reprintedin 26 I.L.M. 1541 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol]. This agreement establishes specific obligations to limit
the use of chlorofluorocarbons and other chemicals that deplete the ozone
layer. It affects the maquiladoras only indirectly, in that it limits the manufacture of certain substances.
103. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, UNEP Doc. IG 80/3, 28 I.L.M.
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3) The Agreement Between the United States of America and
the United Mexican States on Cooperation for the Protection
and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area (The
La Paz Agreement).' i 4
Although it allows these agreements to remain undisturbed
as part of the environmental regulatory scheme that applies to
the maquiladoras, 0 5 NAFTA incorporates few, if any of these
agreements' specific environmental obligations.'06 Incorporation of environmental obligations is important because it would
allow those obligations to be enforced under NAFTA. However,
because provisions of the environmental agreements that take
precedence over NAFTA are limited to "specific trade obligations" set forth in those agreements, 10 7 very few provisions will
08
be implicated.
C.

INVESTMENT PROVISIONS

Chapter 11 of NAFTA contains the investment provisions
that will govern all foreign investment between the parties. Specifically, this chapter applies to measures adopted or maintained
by the government of a party, relating to investors and investments of another party. 0 9
NAFTA's investment provisions attempt to protect each
party's existing environmental regulations by allowing a country
657 (1989). This agreement creates obligations regarding the shipment of haz-

ardous wastes between countries. It is relevant to the maquiladoras because
maquiladoras are required to ship hazardous wastes back to the country of origin. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. The Basel Convention is of limited applicability with respect to incorporating environmental obligations under
NAFTA, however, because it allows individual countries to set their own environmental standards and procedures regarding the shipment of wastes, rather
than creating multilateral standards. Feeley & Knier, supra note 23, at 278.
104. See La Paz Agreement, supra note 58. Because this agreement already
directly regulates maquiladoras, obligations under this agreement are the most
relevant in this context.
105. The rest of the regulatory scheme is composed of Mexican law and parallel initiatives between the U.S. and Mexican governments. See supra part II.
See also infra part IV.
106. See infra part III.D.
107. NAFTA, art. 104(1).
108. Because the agreements listed in Article 104 of NAFTA are all environmental agreements, they contain very few "specific trade obligations." The
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer contains obligations to limit trade to non-parties to the agreement. Montreal Protocol, art. 4,
supra note 102, at 1554-55. This obligation is irrelevant with respect to the maquiladora problem, however, because it addresses types of manufacturing,
rather than the conduct of manufacturers.
109. NAFTA, art. 1101, 1(a),(b).
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to impose any standard it deems appropriate, so long as those
standards are applied equally to domestically-owned enterprises. 110 These provisions emphasize each country's right to
choose its own level of environmental protection without outside
interference."'
This chapter also echoes the general sentiments set forth in
the preamble by providing that a party may adopt, maintain, or
enforce any measure it considers appropriate to ensure that investment "is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental
concerns. 11 2 The generality of this statement, however, suggests that this investment provision will probably have little
practical effect on environmental regulation and enforcement.
Finally, this chapter explicitly recognizes that "it is inappropriate to encourage investment by relaxing domestic... environmental measures.""x l3 This language is weak, however, because
it merely states that parties should not waive standards to encourage or retain investment, not that they shall not do so. 1 4 If
a party believes that another party has relaxed standards to encourage investment, NAFTA provides no remedy apart from
consultations to resolve the dispute."l 5 If the dispute is not resolved through these consultations, it is unclear whether formal
(Chapter 20) dispute resolution procedures 116 are available to
the complaining party in order to compel the offending party to
117
rectify the situation.
110. NAFTA, arts. 1102(1) and 1106(2). These provisions are analogous to
the national treatment obligations contained in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which provide, inter alia, that "[tihe products of the
territory of any contracting party... shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws,
regulations and requirements ..
" General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
art. 111(4), opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pts 5,6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700,
55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GA r].
111. NAFTA does not impose environmental standards, but only requires
that any domestic standard imposed by a party be applied in a non-discriminatory manner. This right of self-determination is articulated by Article 904(1),
which asserts that: "[e]ach Party may, in accordance with this Agreement,
adopt, maintain and apply standards-related measures, including those relating
to . . . the environment . .. and measures to ensure their enforcement or
implementation."
112. NAFTA, art. 1114(1).
113. NAFrA, art. 1114(2).
114. Id. Article 1114(2) states in part: "A Party should not waive or otherwise derogate from ... such measures as an encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, expansion, or retention in its territory of an investment."
115. Id.
116. See infra part III.D.
117. See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
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While Chapter 11 directly addresses potential environmental problems that NAFTA may create or amplify, it does not go
far enough to assuage the worst fears of NAFTA's environmental critics. The most immediate environmental problem along
the border today is the lax enforcement of existing laws, rather
than the lowering of standards to attract investment. 118 Moreover, the non-obligatory nature of the language of Chapter 11
environmental provisions" 9 may render it impossible to use
these provisions as the basis for a claim under NAFTA's dispute
120
resolution chapter.

D. DISPUTE RESOLUTION
At best, NAFTA's dispute resolution procedures provide
only a glimmer of hope for affirmative solutions to the maquiladora problem. Theoretically, these procedures could serve as
an enforcement mechanism that would allow the United States
to compel Mexican enforcement of environmental regulation in
limited situations. Although the text itself makes no reference
to this type of use, the dispute resolution procedures in NAFTA
may be able to trigger provisions of other environmental agreements which previously have been ineffective or unenforceable.121 If this actually happened, the merger of NAFTA with
these agreements would effectively produce a dynamic and enforceable - albeit limited - scheme of environmental regulation among the United States, Mexico, and Canada.
Chapter 20 of NAFTA defines the institutions and procedures to be utilized in resolving disputes among parties. These
procedures apply with respect to all disputes regarding the interpretation or application of NAFTA, or "wherever a Party considers that an actual or proposed measure of another party is or
22
would be inconsistent with the obligations of this agreement."'
To the extent that "obligations of this Agreement" include the
118. Although NAFTA Article 1114(2) addresses enforcement problems to a
limited degree, "[i]t
misses the main current problem which is lax enforcement
of existing laws, rather than the lowering of standards to attract investment."
ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, supra note 90, at 4.
119. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
120. See infra text accompanying notes 150-51.
121. See supra part III.B. The La Paz Agreement and its annexes, for example, contain specific environmental obligations, but they are legally unenforceable because the La Paz Agreement has no dispute resolution procedures or
enforcement provisions.
122. NAFTA, art. 2004.

MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE

[Vol. 2:323

general propositions set forth in the preamble' 2 3 and the investment provisions, 124 and the obligations of the environmental
agreements that take precedence over NAFTA, dispute resolution procedures may be applied to environmental obligations

that are not explicitly stated in the text of NAFTA.
A complaining party initiates dispute resolution under
NAFTA by requesting consultations with another party regarding the disputed measure.' 2 5 The only requirement at this stage
is that "[t]he consulting Parties shall make every attempt to arrive at a mutually satisfactory resolution of any matter through
126
consultations."'
If the parties fail to resolve the dispute through consultations within a specified time period, any party may request a
meeting of the Free Trade Commission (the Commission). 127 At
this meeting, the Commission may "call on such technical advisers or create such working groups or expert groups as it deems
necessary."'12 At this stage, the only mandate is that the Commission help the parties "to reach a mutually satisfactory resolution of the dispute."'2'
If the Commission does not resolve the matter within a
specified period of time, any party may request that the Commission establish an arbitral panel. 130 This panel consists of individuals appointed by a selection process in which each party
selects citizens of the other disputing party.' 3 ' After hearing the
dispute, the panel submits a report to the disputing parties and
123. Generally, preambles of international agreements are relevant only to
matters of interpretation. See supra note 99.
124. See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.

125.
126.

NAFTA, art. 2006(1).
Id. art. 2006(5).

127. Id. art. 2007(1). The Free Trade Commission is a board specifically created to resolve disputes regarding the interpretation and application of NAFTA.
Id. art. 2001(2)(c). A meeting of the Commission may be requested under Art.
2007 only after consultations under Art. 2006 have taken place. Id. art. 2007(1).
128. Id. art. 2007(5)(a).
129. Id. art. 2007(5).
130. Id. art. 2008(1). The establishment of an arbitral panel may not be requested unless the Commission has previously convened, and the matter has
not been resolved. Id.
131. Id. art. 2011(1)(c). The panel consists of one chair, and two panelists
from each country. Id. art. 2011(1). The chair is chosen by consensus of each
party. Id. art. 2011(1)(b). If the parties are unable to agree on a chair within a
specified time period, a disputing party chosen by lot selects a chair who is not a
citizen of that party. Id Panelists and the chair are chosen from a roster of up
to 30 individuals maintained by each party. Id. art. 2009(1). These individuals
may be scientists, experts, industry leaders, or anyone else with the relevant
knowledge to serve on the panel. Id. art. 2009(2)(a).
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to the Commission. 3 2 At this point, there is a mandate that "the
disputing parties shall agree on the resolution of the dispute,
which normally shall conformI3 3with the determinations and recommendations of the panel.'

If the report of the arbitral panel determines that a measure
is inconsistent with the terms of NAFTA, and no agreement has
been reached, the complaining party may suspend the application of "benefits of equivalent effect" until an agreement is
reached. 134 This provision provides the teeth to the dispute resolution procedures. Its potential force is significant because both
the decision of whether to suspend benefits, and the determination of which benefits to suspend are the responsibilities of the
complaining party, not of the arbitral panel or the Free Trade
Commission. 135 While the party affected by the suspension may
request that the Commission establish a panel to determine
whether the level of benefits that have been suspended is "manifestly excessive,"' I 6 the initial power to determine which benefits to suspend lies with the complaining party.
Theoretically, a country may use NAFTA's dispute resolution procedures to compel enforcement of domestic environmental laws through the provisions of the Agreements listed in
Article 104 of NAFTA.13 7 Annex III to the La Paz Agreement,
for example, provides that hazardous wastes from maquiladoras
shall be returned to the country in which the raw materials
originated: "[h]azardous waste generated in the process[ ] of...
manufacturing ...

for which raw materials were utilized and

temporarily admitted, shall continue to be readmitted by the
132. Id. arts. 2017(1) and 2017(3).
133. Id. art. 2018(1).
134. Id. art. 2019(1). This suspension may be initiated 30 days after the parties receive the final report. Id
135. "[Complainingparty may suspend the application to the Party complained against of benefits of equivalent effect .... ." Id, (emphasis added). "In
considering what benefits to suspend... a complaining party should first seek
to suspend benefits in the same sector or sectors .... " Id. art. 2019(2)(a). (emphasis added).
The significance of this becomes clear when compared to the seldom used
enforcement mechanism of the dispute resolution procedure in the GAT. In
the GATT mechanism, only the Contracting Parties (collective parties to the
agreement) may make the decision to allow a party to suspend concessions or
obligations under GATT. GATT, art. XXIII; 2. Under this provision of the
GATT, only one dispute has resulted in the suspension of concessions. JOHN H.
JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 96 (1989); JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD
TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 185 (1969). For further discussion of GATT

dispute resolution procedures, see id. at 178-87.
136. NAFTA, art. 2019(3).
137. See supra part III.B.
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country of origin of the raw materials ...

u"138 In addition, An-

MIN.

nex III provides that each party should enforce its domestic laws
applying to transboundary shipment of hazardous wastes:
"[e]ach party shall ensure... that its domestic laws and regulations are enforced with respect to transboundary shipments of
hazardous waste and hazardous substances ... that pose dangers
to public health, property and the environment."'139
Taken together, these provisions of the La Paz Agreement
constitute "specific trade obligations" within the meaning of
NAFTA Article 104.140 According to the terms of Article 104, if
La Paz Agreement obligations conflict with NAFTA provisions,
the La Paz Agreement "shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency.' 14 1 In this situation, it is "inconsistent with the obligations of [NAFTA]' 142 for a party to disregard La Paz Agreement
obligations in observance of conflicting NAFTA provisions.
As an example, consider a hypothetical situation in which
Mexican authorities allow maquiladoras in Reynosa, Tamaulipas, to dump untreated liquid waste directly into the Rio
Grande, in blatant disregard of Mexican law, 143 La Paz Agree138. La Paz Agreement, supra note 58, Annex III, art. XI. This interpretation assumes that article XI is indeed a mandate to maquiladoras, and not
merely an obligation of the country where the raw materials originated. See
supra note 74. Although this issue was rendered moot by Mexico's General
Ecology Law, it would require a reconsidered interpretation in this context.
This is because Article 104 of NAFTA refers to obligations in trade agreements,
and not to obligations of domestic law.
139. La Paz Agreement, supra note 58, Annex III, art. 11(2). Although the
Annexes to the La Paz Agreement are not expressly included within Article
104(1) of NAFTA, the Annexes existing at the time of the signing of NAFTA
will most likely be interpreted as part of the La Paz Agreement. Any future
Annexes to the La Paz Agreement will probably have to be agreed upon in
accordance'with Article 104(2) of NAFTA: "The Parties may agree in writing
to modify Annex 104.1 to include any amendment to the agreements listed in
paragraph 1, and any other environmental or conservation agreement."
140. Because maquiladoras are plants that manufacture for export, obligations in international agreements concerning the operation of maquiladoras
must be considered "trade obligations." The obligation to ensure that hazardous wastes are disposed of in a specific manner, especially considering that disposal involves transboundary shipments between the parties to the La Paz
Agreement, must certainly be considered a "specific trade obligation" within
the meaning of Article 104 of NAFTA. The corresponding obligation to enforce
domestic laws with respect to shipments of hazardous wastes from maquiladoras, referred to in the La Paz Agreement, Annex III, Article 11(2), is a necessary component of the obligation to dispose of hazardous wastes in a specified
manner. Enforcement is therefore part of the "specific trade obligation" that
has been created in the La Paz Agreement, Annex III, Articles 11(2) and XI.
141. NAFTA, art. 104(1).
142. NAFTA, art. 2004. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
143. Mexico's General Ecology Law regulates the disposal of hazardous
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ment obligations, 144 and U.S. EPA objections. In response, the
United States, fearing that this indiscriminate disposal will create dangerous environmental conditions in McAllen, Texas, and
other communities down river, initiates NAFTA's dispute resolution procedures in an attempt to compel Mexican authorities
to enforce applicable regulations. The United States charges
that Mexican authorities in Reynosa have relaxed environmental standards in order to encourage investment, in violation of
Article 1114 of NAFTA. 145 The United States further argues
that hazardous wastes from maquiladoras should be returned to
the United States in accordance with La Paz Agreement obligations. Mexico responds by arguing that they are simply applying
environmental standards in accordance with Articles 904 and
1102 of NAFTA, which allow them to choose their own standards of environmental regulation, so long as it is done on a nondiscriminatory basis. 146
In this situation, the text of NAFTA supports the U.S. position because specific trade obligations in the La Paz Agreement
- the obligations to ensure that hazardous wastes from maquiladoras are disposed of in a specific manner 147 - are inconsistent with NAFTA provisions allowing Mexico to determine
their own standards of environmental regulation. 148 According
to Article 104 of NAFTA, the obligations of the La Paz Agreement "shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency." Accordingly, the dispute may be the subject of NAFTA's Chapter 20
dispute resolution procedures because it addresses "the application of this Agreement," and concerns "an actual.., measure of
another Party... [that] is ...inconsistent with the obligations of

this Agreement."'1 49 The non-enforcement of environmental
regulations among the maquiladoras is inconsistent with the obligation not to derogate from environmental measures in order
to acquire or retain investment.
wastes, and requires that all hazardous wastes from maquiladoras be returned

to the country of origin of raw materials. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
149. NAFTA, art. 2004. It is not clear whether non-enforcement of domestic
law will be considered a "measure" within the meaning of Article 2004 of
NAFTA. Even if it is not, however, the dispute involves "the application of
[NAFTA]." Id. This is enough to place it within the authority of Chapter 20
dispute resolution procedures.
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While the preceding hypothetical may appear to present a
plausible situation in which NAFTA could be useful in addressing environmental concerns, several practical difficulties preclude the NAFTA from effectively protecting the environment
in this manner. First and foremost, it is not at all clear that Article 1114 of NAFTA, in discouraging the attraction of investment by relaxing environmental standards, constitutes the type
of obligation which may be the subject of Chapter 20 dispute resolution procedures.
As mentioned previously, the language of Article 1114
phrases the obligation to maintain environmental standards using the word "should" rather than "shall."' 15 Because the word
"should" does not normally imply binding legal force, Article
1114 might be interpreted as imposing no obligation at all. In
order to successfully assert that Article 1114 does impose a legal
obligation, a complaining party must resort to arguments of good
faith and general purpose,' 15 rather than relying on the strength
of the text. As the only provision of NAFTA with which nonenforcement of environmental regulations may be inconsistent,
the interpretation of Article 1114's obligatory nature is crucial to
its role in dispute resolution procedures. If Article 1114 is not
interpreted as a legal obligation, disputes over non-enforcement
of environmental regulations would not be redressible under
152
NAFTA's dispute resolution procedures.
A second problem with the language of Article 1114 is that
it refers to actual standards, and not to enforcement of those
standards. 5 3 In order to allege a violation of this provision, relaxing enforcement of environmental measures must be interpreted as relaxing the environmental measures themselves.
This is not entirely implausible, for the word "measures" may
150. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
151. An argument in support of interpreting Article 1114 as carrying at least
a degree of legally binding force might be based upon the lack of good faith of
the offending party. Even if the obligation not to relax environmental standards is not mandatory, the inclusion of the non-mandatory provision imposes
the obligation to at least make a good faith attempt to comply with that provi-

sion. Furthermore, even without mandatory language, the general purpose of
the provision is clear, and the parties are obligated to make good faith efforts to
effectuate that purpose.
152. In this situation, non-enforcement of environmental regulations would
not be redressible under NAFTA because non-enforcement would not be "inconsistent with the obligations of [NAFTA]." NAFTA, art. 2004. See supra
note 149 and accompanying text.
153. NAFTA, art. 1114(2) states in pertinent part: "it is inappropriate to encourage investment by relaxing . .. environmental measures .
(emphasis

added).
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encompass standards of enforcement as well as standards of regulation. Furthermore, a party must establish that non-enforcement of those standards promotes investment. 154 Whether this
has occurred requires a case by case determination, and is not
amenable to generalization over a wide range of situations.
In addition to employing non-obligatory and somewhat ambiguous language, Article 1114 independently provides for consultations. 5 5 Should a dispute between parties arise under
Article 1114, non-binding consultations mandate only that "the
two Parties shall consult with a view to avoiding any such encouragement."' 56 The existence of these consultations as a separate dispute resolution procedure may preclude the Chapter 20
general dispute resolution mechanism because a more specific
one is provided in Article 1114. Although there is no language in
either Article 1114 or Chapter 20 that explicitly precludes the
initiation of Chapter 20 dispute resolution procedures if Article
1114 consultations fail to resolve the dispute, 57 Article 1114 consultations may have been intended to replace any other forms of
dispute resolution involving this provision. If this is the case, the
non-binding consultations of Article 1114, rather than a dispute
resolution procedure that may ultimately allow the "suspension
of benefits" to the offending party, 58 are the only means by
which problems of non-enforcement of environmental regulations may be redressed under NAFTA.
Using Article 104 references to environmental treaties as a
basis for finding obligations under NAFTA is problematic as
well, because the Agreements listed in Article 104 take precedence over NAFTA only to the extent of the inconsistency be154. Whether such non-enforcement must be explicitly for the purpose of
promoting investment, or may simply have the effect of promoting investment
is unclear. This is a matter of interpretation that will probably not be decided

until the question is directly addressed in an actual dispute. The complaining
party would argue that the effect of promoting investment is enough to constitute a violation under Article 1114.
155. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
156. NAFTA, art. 1114(2).
157. The inclusion of a provision for consultations in Article 1114 indicates
that these consultations must be resorted to before initiating formal dispute resolution procedures under Chapter 20. NAFTA Article 2004 provides that
"[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this Agreement, the dispute settlement provisions of this Chapter shall apply .... This does not seem to exclude disputes
over Article 1114 from these procedures. Moreover, the reference to "other
consultative provisions of this Agreement" in Article 2006(5) seems to suggest
that dispute resolution procedures apply equally to provisions outside of Chapter 20 that require consultations.
158. See supra notes 134-136 and accompanying text.
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tween NAFTA and the specific obligations of the conflicting
agreement. 159 Obligations under the La Paz Agreement, for example, would only be implicated if a party's failure to enforce
domestic environmental laws were somehow linked to provisions of NAFTA. 16° It is more likely, however, that the failure
to enforce these laws would result from factors unrelated to
NAFTA. 16 1 In this case, although a party has failed to meet the
obligations in the La Paz Agreement, no inconsistency exists.
The provisions of NAFVTA are not implicated, and the dispute
resolution procedures are therefore unavailable.
Another problem with the use of Article 104 in dispute resolution procedures is that it requires a "specific trade obligation"
of an environmental agreement to conflict with NAFTA obliga162
tions before the outside agreement will be given precedence.
General environmental obligations contained in those agreements will therefore never take precedence over NAFTA.
Given that the agreements currently listed in Article 104 contain
very few "specific trade obligations,"' 63 situations which require
deference to these agreements will seldom arise in the context
of NAFTA.
IV.

OTHER SOLUTIONS

As it becomes clear that NAFTA's solutions to the maquiladora problem are limited at best, a more fundamental question
must be addressed. Is a free trade agreement the best place to
find solutions to environmental problems? Environmentalists
argue that it is unconscionable to remove trade barriers without
ensuring that we do not create a pollution haven along our
southern border. t64 If the United States had complete control to
159. NAFTA, art. 104(1). See supra text accompanying note 141.
160. In the preceding hypothetical, for example, Mexico had justified nonenforcement of environmental regulations with Articles 904 and 1102 of
NAFTA. See supra text accompanying note 146.
161. The lack of economic resources, for example, is a much more plausible
reason for non-enforcement of environmental regulations than is the desire to

attract investment, or to autonomously control domestic environmental standards. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
162. NAFTA, art. 104. See also supra note 107 and accompanying text.
163. In fact, the provisions listed supra at notes 138-39 are most likely the
only parts of the La Paz Agreement that might be interpreted as "specific trade
obligations." See also supra note 108 and accompanying text.
164. Michael Fischer, Safeguard the Environment When Increasing Trade,
S.F. CHRON., Aug. 28, 1992, at A29. Michael Fischer is executive director of the
Sierra Club in Washington, D.C. Fischer argues that by endorsing NAFTA
without mandating U.S. companies in Mexico to comply with U.S. environmen-
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avoid such a possibility, perhaps these arguments would be more
compelling. An ideal trade agreement would allow the removal
of trade barriers while mandating that environmental standards
would be maintained, harmonized, and rigorously enforced. It is
unrealistic, however, to expect NAFTA to live up to these
65
aspirations.
Historically, Mexico has been resistant to U.S. efforts to
control Mexican domestic policies.' 66 In the political context in
which NAFTA was negotiated, historical distrust generated a
great deal of Mexican resistance to creating such a permanent
relationship with the United States. 167 As a result, the Mexican
government has taken the firm position that environmental
problems along the border should be addressed through cooperative efforts of the United States and Mexico, 168 rather than by
U.S. interference or coercion. The Bush Administration also advanced this position, and it is the assumption under which the
NAFTA negotiations were conducted. 169 Realistically, theretal law, the Bush Administration is sacrificing environmental safety and public
health standards. Id.
165. In testimony before the International Trade Subcommittee of the Senate Finance Committee, William Reilly, the former Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency commented that NAFTA cannot, and should not,
be asked to carry the amount of "environmental freight" that many people are
suggesting it should. Although Mr. Reilly's terminology might have been more
artfully chosen, his point is that as a trade agreement, and not an environmental agreement, NAFTA is not the appropriate forum in which to address the full
spectrum of environmental problems in Mexico and the United States. International Trade Subcommittee of the Senate Finance Committee, FEDERAL NEWS
SERVICE, Sept. 16, 1992, at *40, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
166. This historic antipathy is one reason that attempts to impose U.S. environmental standards on Mexico would probably be counterproductive and offensive to the Mexican government. Feeley & Knier, supra note 23, at 287.
167. Jesus Silva & Richard K. Dunn, A Free Trade Agreement Between the
United States and Mexico: The Right Choice?, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 937, 945
(1990). For further discussion on historical Mexican attitudes towards foreign
investment, see id. at 945-53.
168. Louis Donaldo Colosio, Environment and Development in Mexico, (remarks at the U.S.-Mexico Border Environment Assembly and Colloquy, June
25, 1992) (on file with the Minnesota Journal of Global Trade). Colosio asserted
that "effective solutions will be reached only by strengthening cooperation,
sharing technological advances and articulating efforts from all environmental
agencies." In addition, Colosio proposed the idea that Canada also participate in
these cooperative efforts. Id.
169. William K. Reilly, Pollution Won't Be a Byproduct, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 2,
1992, at M5. William Reilley was the administrator of the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency during the Bush Administration. Reilley argues that
NAFIA is an environmentally responsible agreement, but refers mainly to cooperative efforts between the United States and Mexico that "complement the
environmental provisions of the agreement." Id.
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fore, the most hope in solving the maquiladora problem lies in
cooperative efforts between the governments of the United
170
States and Mexico.
The most promising of these such efforts has been underway for over a year. The Environmental Plan for the MexicanU.S. Border (The Border Plan), signed by President Bush and
President Salinas de Gortari in March of 1992, is a comprehensive agreement designed to address current environmental
problems on the border in a cooperative manner. 17 ' This plan
coordinates joint U.S-Mexican enforcement projects, outlines
training programs, and provides a plan for infrastructure development at the border. 172 The Border Plan will potentially be
the primary vehicle through which international environmental
provisions affecting the border region will be developed and
173
enforced.
Under the Border Plan, bilateral efforts between the EPA
and SEDESOL will come in four different forms. First, a bi-national working group has been formed to serve as a formal
mechanism for shaping cooperative enforcement efforts, and developing a strategy to enhance these efforts. 7 4 Second, the EPA
and SEDESOL will attempt to build enforcement capacity by
conducting cooperative training visits to facilities on both sides
of the border, and having inspectors and other enforcement personnel of both agencies meet regularly in workshops, seminars,
170. Another suggested solution to the maquiladora problem is for the
United States to require American companies operating in Mexico to comply
with U.S. environmental standards. See supra note 164. While this type of solution may produce short-term results, it is limited because it does nothing to help
Mexico deal with an essentially Mexican problem. As future border development includes Mexican and non-American foreign companies, U.S. legislation
will be unable to reach these companies. Moreover, enforcement of U.S. legislation in Mexico would require infringement on Mexico's national sovereignty, a
subject of historic sensitivity. See supra note 166 and accompanying text. For
further discussion on this type of proposal, see Feeley & Knier, supra note 23, at
291-92.
171. EPA BORDER PLAN SUMMARY, supra note 3, at 20. The general goal of
the Border Plan is to provide long-term environmental protection to the border
area. Four specific objectives of the border plan are to: (1) strengthen enforcement of existing laws; (2) reduce pollution through new initiatives; (3) increase
cooperative planning, training, and education; and (4) improve understanding of
the border environment. Id.
172. BNA Environmental Provisions, supra note 10, at 245.
173. The Border Plan is a long-term plan intended to guide environmental
efforts along the border into the 21st century. EPA BORDER PLAN SUMMARY,
supra note 3, at 20. See also Reilly, supra note 169 and accompanying text.
174. EPA BORDER PLAN SUMMARY, supra note 3, at 21.
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and field exercises. 175 Third, enforcement information will be
shared between the two agencies through a coordinated and
computerized system of tracking hazardous waste shipments
crossing the border. 176 Finally, cooperative enforcement actions
will be undertaken in which personnel from SEDESOL and the
EPA will work together to achieve stated environmental
177
goals.
Cooperative training and educational programs under the
Border Plan will target emergency preparedness and response
personnel, government officials, the private sector, and the
general public.178 The goals of these programs will be to increase public safety and to involve the public in protecting the
border environment. 179 While environmentalists have criticized
NAFTA for failing to provide for public involvement in the enforcement of environmental laws, 8 0 the Border Plan reflects
this type of commitment. The Mexican government has also
emphasized social participation as essential to the success of
solving environmental challenges.' 8 '
The Border Plan provides plans for infrastructure development through several new initiatives that will be undertaken
175. Id. These efforts reflect the belief that an understanding of the other's
legal system, regulatory approaches, and enforcement methods are essential to
success in improving enforcement capacity. Id.
176. I& at 22.
177. Id. These activities may include practical measures such as unannounced, high visibility inspection at border crossings, as well as planning measures, such as the targeting of geographic areas of mutual interest and concern
for extra protection. Id
178. Id. at 28.
179. Id. Educational programs are the primary method with which the Border Plan hopes to initiate public participation in environmental efforts. The
EPA's participation in educational efforts will be governed by the National Environmental Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 5501-5510, which calls for joint efforts
with Mexico and Canada to develop environmental education initiatives. EPA
BORDER PLAN SUMMARY, supra note 3, at 28-29.
180. ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, supra note 90, at 4-5. In NAFTA's dispute
resolution procedures in particular, environmental groups had hoped that public participation would be incorporated. They argue that public participation is
important as a means of ensuring accountability, and for the purpose of illuminating broader social concerns. Id.
181. In an interview with the National Wildlife Foundation, Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari asserted that:
There is no way to solve the environmental challenges without social
participation. It's not only a governmental responsibility, which it is,
but it also requires a very strong social participation and I'm very satisfied with the growing movement of nongovernmental organizations in
Mexico. I welcome them and they are participating more and more.
"We Are Talking About Our Children". A Conversation with Mexico's President, INTERNATIONAL WILDLIFE, Sept./Oct. 1992, at 50.
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during its first stage. In order to protect drinking water supplies, for example, funds will be made available for the construcl8 2
tion and improvement of drinking water systems in colonias.
In order to improve the disposal of solid and hazardous wastes,
the Border Plan calls for approximately $25 million in Mexican
investment to expand solid waste collection capacity and construct new landfills in several border cities.1i 3 In an effort to
improve urban air quality, Mexico also plans to invest approximately $168 million for the improvement of border area roads,
bridges, traffic circulation and public transportation systems
during the first stage of the Border Plan. i s4 The lack of specific
project proposals and funding plans, something that NAFTA has
been criticized for, ls 5 is less of a problem with the Border Plan.
The Border Plan has been criticized, however, for lacking
practical mechanisms to implement many of its ultimate
goals.1i 6 Indeed, the Border Plan is still in its evolutionary
stages, and only addresses the three year period from 1992 to
1994.187 The second stage, covering the period from 1995 to 2000,
will use information obtained from current studies to continue
combatting environmental problems.188 Future activities will

likely focus on air and water quality, hazardous waste controls,
182. EPA BORDER PLAN SUMMARY, supra note 3, at 24. These funds will be
available in the form of loans from the State of Texas, the EPA, and the Rural
Development Administration of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Id.
183. Id. at 25. These plans include the purchase of containers, collection vehicles, and heavy equipment for landfills; the purchase of waste collection
equipment; and the construction of landfills. Id
184. Id. This part of the plan does not affect air pollution caused by direct
emissions from maquiladoras. Air pollution caused by urbanization that has resulted from the development of the maquiladora industry, however, is as much
a part of the maquiladora problem as air pollution directly emitted from plants.
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
185. ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, supra note 90, at 2. Environmental groups
criticize NAFTA for lacking a funding mechanism for infrastructure development, and environmental enforcement and clean-up. Id.
186. Feeley & Knier, supra note 23, at 265. The lack of specificity of the
Border Plan has prompted critics to characterize it as nothing more than a set
of "plans to plan." Economist Proposes That NAFTA Include Trinational
Superfund for Environment, Daily Rep. for Execs. (BNA) Nov. 1, 1991, at A2
(cited in Feeley & Knier, supra note 23, at 265 n.46).
187. Region IV - Regional Administrator Wynne Focuses on Cleaning up
.S.-Mexico BorderArea, Int'l Envtl Daily (BNA) Aug. 17, 1992, at *6, available
in WESTLAW, BNA-IED Database. The Border Plan is an evolutionary initiative, in which future projects will depend upon the success and knowledge
gained from previous experience within the plan. Id.
188. EPA BORDER PLAN SUMMARY, supra note 3, at 30. The activities undertaken during the second stage of the Border Plan will be defined by the
information collected during the first stage. Id.
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information exchanges, and assessments of environmental impact of new and existing companies. 189 Although it is now impossible to measure the degree of success that the Border Plan
will ultimately achieve, the fact that it aggressively addresses
current environmental problems along the border should be
viewed optimistically.
While the Border Plan provides hope for the productive resolution of the maquiladora problem, the political reality is that it
is not mandated by the La Paz Agreement, NAFTA, or any
other binding international agreement. 9 0 The implementation
of its programs depends upon funding by both the U.S. and Mexican governments. The Bush Administration's fiscal year 1993
budget request included over $240 million for the protection of
the border environment. 191 Although Congress did not approve
the entire request,192 it is reasonably certain that significant
funding will be available from the United States. 193 The pivotal
issue is whether Mexico will be able to appropriate sufficient
funding to support the Border Plan, and otherwise provide adequate environmental protection for the border area.
Economic benefits generated by NAFTA are likely to provide a significant increase in technical and human resources in
189. New Rules - The NAFTA Adds an InternationalDimension to Environmental Regulation, Business Mexico, Oct. 1992, at *5-6, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Omni File.
190. Increasingly, however, both critics and supporters of NAFTA have
called for a supplemental environmental side agreement to accompany
NAFTA. See, e.g., Memorandum from C. Ford Runge and Raymond Mikesell,
Recommendations for Meeting Environmental Concerns Regarding North
American Free Trade Agreement Without Renegotiating the Agreement
(NAFTA) (Jan. 29, 1993) (on file with The Minnesota Journalof Global Trade).
Such an agreement would likely apply a degree of legally binding force to cooperative initiatives such as the Border Plan. In addition, environmental officials
in the United States, Mexico, and Canada have proposed the formation of a
North American Commission on the Environment, a trilateral group to oversee
the environmental aspects of NAFTA. NAFTA. Focus on Side Deals, Legislation, NWF Official Advises Environmentalists,Int'l Envtl. Daily (BNA) Feb. 8,
1993, at *3, available in WESTLAW, BNA-IED Database.
191. EPA BORDER PLAN SUMMARY, supra note 3, at 33. This request included, inter alia, $30 million for water-related facilities, $2 million for public
health projects, and $5.4 million for credit and loan guarantees for environmental projects. Id. at 32-33.
192. News Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the President, Aug. 12, 1992, at *3, available in WESTLAW, NAFTA Database.
193. While the Environmental Report complains that "funds for these necessary expenditures would be subject to the vagaries of the appropriations process in the U.S.," the contention is that funding levels will not be appropriately
high, not that they will not be significant. ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, supra note
90, at 3.
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Mexico. 194 This expectation has been fueled by several studies
which have suggested that NAFTA will most likely lead to improvement of Mexican environmental problems. 195 An extensively cited study by Gene Grossman and Alan Krueger of
Princeton University, for example, found that with the increase
of per capita income, more resources become available to prevent environmental damage. When a country's per capita income reaches about $4,000 to $5,000 U.S. dollars, economic
growth tends to correspond with the alleviation of pollution
problems. 196 With a per capita GDP of about $5,000, Mexico is
to
currently at a point where further economic growth is likely
197
be accompanied by improving environmental conditions.
The concept of using wealth generated by NAFTA to address pre-existing environmental problems has been criticized
by certain environmental groups as "environmental deficit financing.' 198 The concept, however, has received widespread
support by economists' 99 and many environmentalists. 2° ° Because it is well known that environmental clean-up and prevention requires economic resources, the idea makes intuitive sense.
As the Los Angeles Times editorial board asserts:
194. Mexico: Foreign Investors Will Not Be Able to Pollute Environment,
Top Official Says, 15 Int'l Envtl Rep. (BNA) 527 (Aug. 17, 1992).
195. See, e.g., G.M. Grossman & A.B. Krueger, EnvironmentalImpacts of a
North American Free Trade Agreement, paper prepared for a conference on the

U.S.-Mexico Free Trade Agreement, Princeton University, Oct. 1991 (linking
economic growth with the alleviation of pollution problems); Linda Trocki, Science, Technology, Environment and Competitiveness in a North American

Context, paper presented at a meeting of the North American Institute, Nov. 89, 1991 (examining economically efficient implementation of environmental
regulation); and Adalberto Garcia Rocha & Marco Antonio Michel Diaz, An Estimate of the EnvironmentalImpact of Free Trade with Mexico, paper delivered
at a conference at the Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy, Dec. 1991 ("A
free trade area will have a major positive impact on the environment through
the widening of technological alternatives, both in processes and in products
196. Grossman & Krueger, supra note 195, at 19.
197. Id at 20.
198. ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, supra note 90, at 1.
199. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
200. According to Jay Hair, president of the National Wildlife Federation:
The job ahead is to forge environmentally sound free-trade agreements, beginning with Mexico. We should not obstruct a path that can
lead to significant international benefits .... The means of addressing
environmental concerns are directly tied to economic development. If
environmental progress is not to remain solely the property of affluent
nations, developing nations must have their fair shot at progress. Free
Trade incorporating sound environmental principles enhances that
prospect of advancement.
Jay Hair, Nature Can Live with Free Trade, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1991, § 4 at 17.
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Arguing for strict environmental controls in Mexico before a free-trade
pact is in place is akin to putting the proverbial cart before the horse.
The political will to clean up pollution exists; the question is not
whether Mexico wants
to clean up its act, but how. A free-trade pact is
201
part of the answer.

V.

CONCLUSION

Given the expectation of further increase in development in
the border area in the wake of NAFTA, the maquiladora problem assumes a great sense of urgency. Solutions require both a
commitment to correct the problem, and the resources to do so.
While concerns that NAFTA may exacerbate the maquiladora
problem are not unfounded, this does not mean that solutions to
the problem must be found solely in NAFTA itself. NAFTA
does not offer, nor does it purport to offer, solutions to such serious environmental problems. As a trade agreement, rather than
an environmental agreement, it has only limited tools to address
environmental problems. The success of solutions such as those
contained in the Border Plan, however, may well depend on the
financial resources which NAFIA promises to bring. If these
resources are applied effectively, cooperative initiatives such as
the Border Plan offer realistic and effective solutions to the maquiladora problem.

201. It CostsMoney to be Clean, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 29,1991, at B4 (emphasis in
original).

